Giorgio Agamben delves into the ancient Greek distinction between zoe and bios in an essay entitled “Form-of-Life.” These terms, he notes, are in fact nuanced definitions for what, in English especially, we call only life: “zoe, which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings… and bios, which signified the form or manner of living peculiar to a single individual or group” (Agamben 2000). He offers a further refinement within bios, however, with the hyphenated term form-of-life, or “a life that can never be separated from its form, a life in which it is never possible to isolate something such as naked life” (3-4). Essential to the form-of-life is potentiality or possibility:
A life that cannot be separated from its form is a life for which what is at stake in its way of living is living itself. What does this formulation mean? It defines a life – human life – in which the single ways, acts, and processes of living are never simply facts but always and above all possibilities of life, always and above all power. Each behavior and each form of human living is never prescribed by a specific biological vocation, nor is it assigned by whatever necessity; instead, no matter how customary, repeated, and socially compulsory, it always retains the character of a possibility; that is, it always puts at stake living itself. That is why human beings – as beings of power who can do or not do, succeed or fail, lose themselves or find themselves – are the only beings for whom happiness is always at stake in their living, the only beings whose life is irremediably and painfully assigned to happiness. But this immediately constitutes the form-of-life as political life. (Agamben 2000)
This is a crucial distinction for Agamben, because political life is form-of-life, and human life is always already predicated on a distinction above and beyond the zoe/bios split. It is not enough that humankind are not merely biologically alive, nor that we have a “form or manner of living,” which is true for all animals. A wild dog separated from a pack is both biologically alive and in possession of a form or manner of living; an ape raised in captivity may be both bored and well fed, but is in possession of both zoe and bios. It is only humankind, Agamben asserts, that requires form and happiness to go hand-in-hand.
This formulation of life, as form-of-life, is what allows Agamben to trace the originary relationship of sovereign power to be the state of exception, wherein the sovereign decides on the life or death of the subject. Form-of-life is effaced in this relation, and the power of life (its potentiality) is interrupted and disrupted by various apparatuses (Agamben 2009). He notes:
The Marxian scission between man and citizen is thus superseded by the division between naked life (ultimate and opaque bearer of sovereignty) and the multifarious forms of life abstractly recodified as social-juridical identities (the voter, the worker, the journalist, the student, but also the HIV-positive, the transvestite, the porno star, the elderly, the parent, the woman) that all rest on naked life.
Agamben is concerned with this trend, in that it separates human action from happiness (politics), redirecting the realm of action towards questions of mere survival or the lessening of exploitation rather than towards the “good life.” This concern leads him, in several works, to insist on a non-Statist politics:
A political life, that is, a life directed toward the idea of happiness and cohesive with a form-of-life, is thinkable only starting from the emancipation of such a division, with the irrevocable exodus from any sovereignty. The question about the possibility of a nonstatist politics necessarily takes this form: Is today something like a form-of-life, a life for which living itself would be at stake in its own living, possible? Is today a life of power available? (Agamben 2000)
What could be the politics of whatever singularity, that is, of a being whose community is mediated not by any condition of belonging (being red, being Italian, being Communist) nor by the simple absence of conditions (a negative community, such as that recently proposed in France by Maurice Blanchot), but by belonging itself? … The novelty of the coming politics is that it will no longer be a struggle for the conquest or control of the State, but a struggle between the State and the non-State (humanity), an insurmountable disjunction between whatever singularity and the State organization. (Agamben 1993)
This brings Agamben directly into conversation with a multitude of contemporary authors discussing community (i.e. Nancy, Blanchot, Derrida, Esposito) and the common (i.e. Hardt and Negri, Zizek). Form-of-life is contingent upon a relation between “common power” and thought:
Intellectuality and thought are not a form of life among others in which life and social production articulate themselves, but they are rather the unitary power that constitutes the multiple forms of life as form-of-life. In the face of state sovereignty, which can affirm itself only by separating in every context naked life from its form, they are the power that incessantly reunites life to its form or prevents it from being dissociated from its form. (Agamben 2000)
Ultimately, form-of-life is neither the State-form, reliant upon sovereignty and therefore zoe, nor is it mere “community,” reliant upon identification and distinction; form-of-life is, rather, the potential or possibility of the good life as life, where means and ends are in and of themselves indistinguishable, where life and happiness are entirely co-incidental. Form-of-life is explicitly Spinozist, then, in that the particular form of expression is entirely incidental to the being-together of bodies in action. The coming politics, therefore, is not an identitarian politics, but a multitudinous politics, governed by affect, directed by singularities (of whatever kind…).
Understanding politics in this manner, though, brings a kind of absent presence to the center of any analsysis of the political: the figure of the figure of politics. The figure of the figure of politics… Agamben mobilizes a series of figures in his essays that each in their own way works to disfigure the political. In his early works, the figures “the man without content” and “infant” are mobilized; his later works are marked by more explicitly ‘political’ figures: homo sacer, the sovereign, the Muselmann, the whatever singularity. The figure of the figure operates throughout Agamben’s work as a sort of deconstructive force that in its ambiguity, opacity, critiques and complicates, or disfigures. He is slippery, unable to be pinned down to a positive politics; indeed, his most political text, The Coming Community, does not put forth a positive project as much as it poses a series of exemplary figures culminating in “Tiananmen” with the figure of “a herald from Beijing”: the nameless, faceless image of the man with a shopping bag standing in front of a tank in Tiananmen Square (Agamben 1993).
The figure of the coming politics, however, does not end with the “herald from Beijing,” and in fact comes to a rather pointed assertion in “Beyond Human Rights.” For Agamben, the figure of the figure of politics, par excellence, is not the citizen, nor is it man, the worker, sovereignty, the people, or rights (Agamben 2000). The ghostly image of the political is thus the figure of the refugee:
It is not only the case that the problem presents itself inside and outside of Europe with just as much urgency as then. It is also the case that, given the by now unstoppable decline of the nation-state and the general corrosion of traditional political-juridical categories, the refugee is perhaps the only thinkable figure for the people of our time and the only category in which one may see today – at least until the process of dissolution of the nation-state and of its sovereignty has achieved full completion – the forms and limits of a coming political community. It is even possible that, if we want to be equal to the absolutely new tasks ahead, we will have to abandon decidedly, without reservation, the fundamental concepts through which we have so far represented the subjects of the political (Man, the Citizen and its rights, but also the sovereign people, the worker, and so forth) and build our political philosophy anew starting from the one and only figure of the refugee. (Agamben 2000, 16)